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LIABILITY FOR TOXIC WASTE CLEAN-UP
— by Neil E. Harl*
A late 1994 U.S. District Court case in California1 has
raised a serious question about the liability of executors,
administrators and other fiduciaries for the costs of toxic
waste clean-up while the fiduciary had responsibility for the
property in question. The potential liability of secured
lenders for toxic waste clean-up has been a matter of
concern for several years,2 but the liability of fiduciaries has
only recently been raised and litigated.3
Castlerock Estates
In the California case, Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate
of Markham,4 the environmental contamination was caused
by cattle dipping on a ranch over a lengthy period.
Apparently, the chemical dip spilled and contaminated a 12-
acre tract on the ranch.
The action was brought by the current owner of the
ranch, Castlerock Estates, Inc., in seeking to recover the
clean-up costs from Wells Fargo Bank. Wells Fargo had
acquired Crocker Bank, which had served as conservator
(from 1969 to 1977) and then as executor (from 1977 to
1979) for one of the prior owners of the ranch who was
disabled by illness.5 The case was before the court on a
motion for summary judgment by Wells Fargo Bank.6
Wells Fargo Bank argued that it had never been an
owner or operator of the ranch and, therefore, should not be
liable under CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act or Super
Fund).7 There was evidence that the cattle dipping ended
between 1959 and 1964 but other evidence indicated that
the dipping continued into the 1970s.8 In any event, the
current owner of the ranch was obligated to pay the clean-
up costs under CERCLA.9
The court noted that, to establish liability under
CERCLA, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to show — (1)
that the defendants either owned or operated the property
and (2) that the defendants owned or operated the property
during the period in which the contamination occurred.10
The court indicated that it would be necessary to hold a trial
as to the question of when the dipping ceased in light of the
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fact that there was a conflict in testimony on that point.
As to whether a conservator or executor can be held
liable as an owner under CERCLA, the court noted that bare
legal title by the fiduciary would not be sufficient for
liability but if other "indicia of ownership" was held by the
fiduciary, liability could attach.11 The court indicated that
the additional "indicia of ownership" could come from
involvement in leasing the ranch (which was the case for a
three-year period),12 from the granting of additional powers
to the fiduciary,13 or participation in the operation of the
ranch.14 The court concluded that adequate evidence had
been offered to raise issues as to the fiduciary's liability.
The court also addressed the question of whether the
fiduciary's liability should be limited to the available estate
or whether the fiduciary would be personally liable.15 The
court concluded that it could not decide that issue on the
basis of the facts before it.
City of Phoenix
A 1993 case, City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co.,16
had involved the question of whether the City of Phoenix
could recover from the trustee of a trust owning a landfill
the costs in cleaning up a contaminated site.
The court determined that the trustee was not liable as
an operator of the landfill under CERCLA but was an
"owner" for purposes of liability under CERCLA even
though only holding bare legal title.17
Section 17 of CERCLA imposes liability on ". . . the
owner and operator of a vessel or facility . . ." for the costs
of clean-up.18 The courts have repeatedly noted that there is
no test of culpability under CERCLA.19
Conclusion
Certainly anyone serving as executor, administrator,
conservator or trustee, whether as a corporate fiduciary or
as an individual, should conduct environmental inspections
before agreeing to serve as fiduciary. Although the scope of
the California case is not entirely clear at this point, the
liability of fiduciaries will likely depend upon the extent of
involvement of the fiduciary in management and operations
involving the property. It is important to note that, in the
California case, the bank as fiduciary was granted greater
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powers under the state's probate law than most fiduciaries
would hold.20
FOOTNOTES
1 Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F.
Supp. 360 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
2 E.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990) (absolute liability imposed on secured
creditor).
3 City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 816 F. Supp.
564 (D. Ariz. 1993) (trustee); Castlerock Estates, Inc. v.
Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Calif. 1994)
(conservator and executor).
4 Id.
5 871 F. Supp. 360, 362 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
6 Id. at 361.
7 42 U.S.C. § 9607 et seq.




12 Id. at 367.
13 Id.
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15 Id. at 369.
16 816 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ariz. 1993).
17 Id. at 568.
18 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.
19 See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Monsanto, 858
F. 2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989).
20 Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F.
Supp. 360, 367 (N.D. Calif. 1994).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
DISABILITY BENEFITS. The debtor was involved in
an automobile accident and received benefits from an
accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy for
the loss of an eye. The payment was received pre-petition
and deposited in the debtor's bank account. The debtor
claimed the proceeds as an exempt disability payment under
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(C). The court held that the proceeds
were not eligible for the exemption because the exemption
was limited to the debtor's right to receive a disability
benefit and the debtor no longer had a right to receive the
benefit since the benefit was already paid. In re Chapman,
177 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
INVOLUNTARY PETITION. Under a divorce
judgment, the debtor was required to pay the former spouse
$500 per week in alimony and $500 per week as child
support for the couple's three minor children. The former
spouse filed an involuntary petition against the debtor on
the former spouse's behalf and on behalf of the three
children. The debtor argued that the petition was
insufficient in that at least three creditors did not sign the
petition. The court held that the three children each
qualified as a claimant sufficient to support the filing of an
involuntary petition. In re Hopkins, 177 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1995).
SUBORDINATION. The debtor was a closely-held
corporation which operated several egg and chick
production facilities. When the debtor began experiencing
financial difficulties, several shareholders who were also
officers made loans or advances to the debtor. Only two of
the loans were documented on the corporation's books and
officially approved by the directors. The shareholders filed
unsecured claims for the amounts loaned to the debtor.
Another unsecured creditor objected to the claims and
sought denial of the claims or at least subordination of the
claims to the other unsecured claims. The creditor alleged
that the loans were inequitable conduct in that the loans
were made when the debtor was undercapitalized and
allowed the debtor to favor some creditors while harming
other creditors who continued to provide credit. The court
held that the creditor failed to demonstrate that the debtor
was undercapitalized when the advances were made or that
the advances were other than bona fide attempts to keep the
debtor in business. Absent any showing of inequitable
conduct, the court held that the claims of the shareholders
could not be subordinated to other unsecured creditors. In
re Colonial Poultry Farms, 177 B.R. 291 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
TRUSTEE FEES.  The Chapter 12 debtor's plan
provided for direct payments of all secured claims, real
estate tax claims and attorney's fees.  Because unsecured
creditors would receive payments only if the debtor had
disposable income, the trustee would not receive any fee
unless disposable income was earned by the debtor.  The
court held that the secured claims could be paid directly to
the creditors without the trustee fee but that the real estate
taxes and attorney's fees were to be paid through the trustee.
The court left open the question of whether the trustee
would receive adequate compensation under the plan and
allowed the trustee to petition for additional fees.  In re
Beard, 45 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g, 177 B.R. 74
(S.D. Ohio 1993), aff'g, 134 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1991). Note: An article by Dr. Harl is scheduled to appear
in the May 5, 1995 Agricultural Law Digest on payment of
trustee's fees in Chapter 12 bankruptcy.
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtors had filed a Chapter 11 case
which was closed in November 1989. The IRS had filed a
